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ABSTRACT
Does the Scientist-Practitioner Gap Have Ontological Roots?
Eric Alexander Ghelfi
Department of Psychology, BYU
Master of Science
In this thesis, the nature and extent of practitioners’ dissatisfaction with the
psychotherapy research literature will first be described. A case will be made that a deeper
analysis needs to be conducted to fully understand this dissatisfaction. Next, this dissatisfaction
will be framed in the context of a particular ontology that seems to have largely contributed to it.
Most importantly, several features of this ontology will be described and connected to
practitioners’ dissatisfaction. Finally, an alternative framework for understanding practitioners’
dissatisfaction will be tentatively proposed, and it will be suggested that this alternative could
help researchers and practitioners understand their dissatisfaction with one another and lead to a
more fruitful dialogue.
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Does the Scientist-Practitioner Gap Have Ontological Roots?
Nearly 70 years after the American Psychological Association officially accredited the
scientist-practitioner model, tension and dissatisfaction persists between psychological
researchers and mental health clinicians. This tension has remained a consistent theme in the
history of psychological research and practice (Cautin, 2011). There is a considerable literature
on the “gap” between psychological scientists and practitioners (e.g., Mumma, 2014; Ogilvie,
2011; Pinsof, Goldsmith, & Latta, 2012; Sobell, 2016), the very gap the Boulder Model was
intended to begin closing in 1949 (Petersen, 2007; Raimy, 1950 as cited by Lau, Ogrodniczuk,
Joyce, & Sochting, 2010). As recently as 2011, this gap “seem[ed] only to be widening” (Cautin,
2011). The communication between researchers and practitioners is sparse and often strained
(Lilienfeld, Ritschel, Lynn, Cautin, & Latzman, 2013), and findings of psychotherapy studies are
notoriously slow to emerge in routine clinical practice (Morris, Wooding, & Grant, 2011). This
relationship has troubled psychologists on both sides of the scientist-practitioner divide
(Newnham & Page, 2010).
Practitioners’ dissatisfaction is additionally troubling given that psychotherapy research
is designed to serve psychological clinicians and their work. If medical professionals did not find
the research or technologies offered to them useful, it would seem of pressing importance to
understand what this research or technology was lacking for physicians, or at least to search for
ways to increase their awareness of how the research findings and technology could improve
their practice. As will be shown, researchers understand poorly why practitioners are dissatisfied
with research. Several commentators have offered opinions on the contributors to this
dissatisfaction (Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Shean, 2013), and several quantitative and qualitative
studies have explored it (e.g., Gyani, Shafran, Myles, & Rose, 2014; Gyani, Shafran, Rose, &
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Lee, 2015). However, the gulf between researchers and practitioners persists (Cha &
DiVasto, 2017; Lau et al., 2010).
In what follows, the nature and extent of practitioners’ dissatisfaction with the
psychotherapy research literature will first be described. A case will be made that a deeper
analysis needs to be conducted to fully understand this dissatisfaction. Next, this dissatisfaction
will be framed in the context of a particular ontology that seems to have largely contributed to it.
Most importantly, several features of this ontology will be described and connected to
practitioners’ dissatisfaction. Finally, an alternative framework for understanding practitioners’
dissatisfaction will be tentatively proposed, and it will be suggested that this alternative could
help researchers and practitioners understand their dissatisfaction with one another and lead to a
more fruitful dialogue.
Practitioner Dissatisfaction
For these purposes, it will be necessary to describe the nature of clinicians’ dissatisfaction
with research in some detail. Although several commentators have discussed the dissatisfaction
of clinicians with research, and several empirical studies have explored these issues, the
literature lacks a coherent theme or theory on the deepest philosophical level explaining the
nature of practitioners’ dissatisfaction. Indeed, the primary purpose of this paper is to provide at
least the beginnings of such a theory. Providing a better understanding of the nature of
practitioners’ dissatisfaction will suggest potential solutions and potential concrete steps that
clinicians and researchers can take to unify their efforts to alleviate the burden of mental illness
and improve the lives of psychotherapy clients.
Although this paper focuses on the dissatisfaction of clinicians with research, the
dissatisfaction—or frustration—has often been mutual between researchers and clinicians. On
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the one hand, psychological researchers have expressed concern about the long latency period
between their discoveries and the implementation of their discoveries in clinical practice
(Christopherson, 2016; Morris et al., 2011), poor adherence among practicing clinicians to
manualized protocols (Kosmerly, Waller, & Robinson, 2015; Waller, 2009), and a general
reluctance or refusal of clinicians to consult empirical research when making clinical decisions
(Lilienfeld et al., 2013). On the other, practicing clinicians have questioned the actual utility or
relevance published findings have for their work with patients and clients (Shean, 2013). In
addition, many articles are separated from clinicians working outside of university-affiliated
settings lack the financial backing to access (Bartunek, 2007; Taubner, Clasen, & Munder,
2016).
This paper focuses on the dissatisfaction of practitioners in particular because it assumes
the purpose of psychotherapy research is to serve psychotherapy clients through practitioners.
Understanding practitioners’ perspective, therefore, constitutes an essential aim in mending the
system where research and practice work jointly to deliver the best possible service to patients
and clients efficiently and effectively. Here, I will examine some themes among clinicians’
dissatisfaction that appear in the literature in detail, attempting to be as thorough as possible.
These themes include (1) cleanness over messiness, (2) the abstractness of research findings, (3)
the lack of concreteness, and (4) the rule-following of research.
Cleanness Over Messiness
Many clinicians have questioned the helpfulness of highly controlled studies (e.g., RCTs)
for their clinical work, often preferring case studies and qualitative work (Gyani et al., 2015). In
fact, in their research on clinician preferences, Gyani and colleagues (2014) wrote: “The finding
that, generally, clinicians prefer to rely on clinical experience rather than research to inform
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treatment decisions replicates previous studies ( . . . Stewart & Chambless, 2007)” (p. 208).
These preferences conflict with what are generally considered the highest standards of evidence
in the psychology research community (American Psychological Association, 2006; Kazdin,
2003; Lilienfeld et al., 2013). Kazdin (2003), a prominent figure in the clinical psychology
methods literature, has stated that “methodology encompasses the procedures and practices of
conducting and designing research so that lawful relations can be identified” (p. 12). Identifying
lawful relations requires the cleaning up the messiness and particularity of observations to
generalize “across different categories of people . . . and across different contexts” (Van Lange,
2013). It is with specific people and contexts that practitioners work, however, with individuals,
couples, and families who are deeply embedded in contexts that are often messy.
Throughout the dialogue between researchers and practitioners, the tension that appears
most prominent is between the desire of the research community to confidently establish an
internally valid system of clean causal relations and the desire of the practitioner community to
understand the effectiveness of their interventions in the thick, varied contexts of their clients.
The result is that, although clinicians are most interested in understanding the idiographic,
researchers—although they often note the importance of the idiographic in clinical practice (e.g.,
Kanter et al., 2009)—focus their work on the nomothetic. This tension has been called a battle
between rigor and relevance (Barkham & Mellor-Clark, 2003) or between efficacy and
effectiveness (Nathan, Stuart, & Dolan, 2000), and it has not gone without definitively successful
attempts as resolution. On the tendency in the research literature to favor internal validity to
external validity, Weisz, Krumholz, Santucci, Thomassin, and Ng (2015) write that “it is an
interesting paradox that funding designed to improve clinical care through research may have
produced treatments that do not fit the very clinical care they were designed to improve” (p.
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145). In this statement, they capture the ethos of much of what follows in this discussion of
clinicians’ dissatisfaction.
Clinicians seem dissatisfied with a status quo that upholds internal validity—the
identification of causal relations—as the highest goal of psychotherapy research. Rather, they
believe the focus should be on the way individual clients experience change in therapy. Consider
what Levine, Sandeen, and Murphy (1992) write about the differences between psychotherapy in
the laboratory and psychotherapy in actual practice:
There is a notable lack of correspondence between what our students do in the clinic and
what they read in the literature . . . We believe that this disparity between clinical practice
and clinical research arises primarily because therapy proceeds idiographically, by
intervening with the individual, while clinical research is organized and presented
nomothetically, generally by use of diagnostic categories. We practice by understanding
and helping the individual while we preach according to universal or group norms. (p.
410)
Clinicians have, in some sense, to “create a new therapy” (Yalom, 2009) for each client, and the
research they find most helpful in this task focuses on the more idiographic pole of
psychotherapy process (Gyani et al., 2014). It focuses on meanings over rules and clean,
quantitatively-based outcomes.
This is not to say practitioners find nomothetic research findings unimportant. To the
contrary, they believe such “scientific advances in psychology and related disciplines are
important to the development of psychological therapies” (Marzillier, 2004). Marzillier,
however, further explains that claims such as “research has shown that 90 percent of people
with panic attacks will recover with anxiety management” are “misleading and simplistic.” He
writes that
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“it is this ‘outcome research’ I have a problem with. It does justice neither to the complexity of
people’s psychology nor to the intricacies of psychotherapy” (p. 392). So, while it is fair to
characterize CBT-oriented clinicians as more heavily research-reliant (Gyani et al., 2014) and to
note that therapists of other orientations see value in the nomothetic research tradition that prizes
internal validity as the highest goal, it stands that the priority of cleaner findings over messier
findings contributes to the dissatisfaction of many psychotherapists with the body of research at
their disposal.
Abstractness of Research Findings
It is no secret that practitioners struggle to identify the relevance of the nuances involved
in the largely abstractive research literature (i.e., research aimed at identifying underlying causal
mechanisms; Begley, 2009). Indeed, clinicians and researchers both lament this struggle—the
former usually calling on the latter to increase the concreteness or particularity of research
(Shean, 2013) and the latter calling on the former to increase their research competence and
literacy (Lilienfeld et al., 2013).
This abstractness of research presents a burden to clinical practitioners, many of whom
work fulltime and are not compensated for their direct consumption of primary research. It is
important for practitioners to experience a high return for their effort in reading research, and the
abstractness of results and the language in which much research is communicated diminishes the
perceived return on effort, as look for resources that help them with particular clients (Gyani et
al., 2014; Gyani et al., 2015; Shean, 2013). Practitioners’ preference for qualitative research and
case studies represents another aspect of their preference for research that helps them understand
messiness and particularity—that is, research that meets them, so to speak, where they are

SCIENTIST-PRACTITIONER GAP

7

(Binder et al., 2011). Case studies and qualitative research focus, after all, on the uniqueness of
client experiences and processes, not on differences between group norms (Levitt, 2015).
As opposed to case studies and qualitative research, most quantitative research is
communicated in a way that does not reflect the language or processes of actual psychotherapy
practice. Rather, it is communicated largely in the rarified language of abstractions and statistics
as applied to groups rather than to individuals (Kazdin, 2003). This trend limits the degree to
which practitioners are able to recognize its relevance in their work. A practicing clinician with a
full caseload will only have so much (likely uncompensated) time in the day to read research,
and when this is considered, it makes sense that many would steer away from more abstract,
statistically-laden research and gravitate toward research that reads with clearer relevance or, as
is more common, seek guidance through supervision or colleague consultation (Stewart &
Chambless, 2007). The difficulty many practitioners find in deciphering the meaning of research
articles leads well into the next theme of practitioner dissatisfaction, the lack of concrete
engagement of research in routine practice.
Lack of Concrete Engagement
The lack of concreteness in research has led to the institution of research itself being out
of touch the routine practice of most clinicians, although it should be noted that efforts are being
made in segments of the research community to engage with routine practice more concretely
(e.g., Warren, Nelson, Mondragon, Baldwin, & Burlingame, 2010). That is, it has led to a state
where those who conduct psychotherapy research often do not even practice psychotherapy
themselves. Himeliem and Putnam (2001), for example, found in a survey of over 200 academic
clinical psychologists that nearly half dedicated no time to clinical practice at all, citing lack of
time and interest as justifications. Despite the synergy the Boulder model aimed to establish

SCIENTIST-PRACTITIONER GAP

8

between research and practice by training researchers as clinicians and clinicians as researchers,
the two groups remain, in Bartunek’s (2007) words, “solid, separate, and challenging for each
other to penetrate” (p. 1323). One prominent reason practitioners have cited for not participating
in research is that the settings of research and practice only slightly overlap (Taubner et al.,
2016). As Meyer (2007) put it, “Many clinicians remain sceptical and disenchanted about the
merits of clinical research, and many academic clinical psychologists remain removed from the
concerns of the clinical trenches, perhaps in part because . . . they rarely engage in clinical
practice” (p. 545).
Evidence of researchers’ disconnection from the concrete particularities of practice can
be found additionally in the difficulty many practitioners have in accessing published research.
Even while working at a university, the number of articles that are published behind paywalls
can present issues for researchers (Shaw, 2016). The problems associated with pay-walled
content are even more pronounced for practicing clinicians, who typically lack university
affiliation and library access. Researchers and practitioners alike have noted this lack of
reciprocity between the lab and the clinic (Cautin, 2011; Gaudiano & Miller, 2013). This gap is
troubling given that published psychotherapy research is meant to serve clients through
practitioners. It is not feasible, for example, for practitioners to spend hundreds of dollars of their
own money to access articles of which they can only read the abstract, and which, therefore,
might not even be useful to their work with clients. Consider what Shaw (2016) says in this
context:
Any psychologist trying to review research literature has encountered a paywall that does
not allow reading of the full text without paying for the article or subscribing to the
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journal. Unless everyone has access to research, then . . . full implementation of
evidence-based practices are not possible. (p. 345).
Shaw highlights the way in which the institution of research is has lost touch with the
concreteness of practice and how it operates, to a large extent, in isolation from everyday
practice.
The Rule-following of Research
Apart from the issue of research lacking concrete engagement in practice, practitioners
have expressed some dissatisfaction with the rule-following of research and of clinical
prescriptions based on research (e.g., Stewart, Chambless, & Baron, 2012). Researchers have
found significant resistance among practitioners to the push for evidence-based practices (EBPs)
and evidence-supported treatments (ESTs; e.g., Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Marzillier, 2004). As was
discussed in the section on the cleanness over messiness, clinicians have questioned whether the
standards that qualify an approach as an EBP truly apply to the context of therapy (Lilienfeld et
al., 2013). As such, they have expressed dissatisfaction with the therapeutic approaches—and the
structure of those approaches (e.g., manualized treatments)—offered to them as options for
treating specific disorders (Shean, 2013).
Some commentators have pointed to the relative ease with which some therapeutic
approaches are supportable via current standards of evidence (e.g., cognitive-behavioral
therapies) and contrasted it to the relative difficulty with which other potentially effective
approaches are able to acquire such empirical support (e.g., interpersonal and existential
psychotherapy; Shean, 2013; Yalom, 1980; Yalom, 2009). They have argued that the push for a
narrow brand of empirical support delegitimizes approaches that they have found beneficial in
their practices and that it constricts the importance of their clinical intuition (Gyani et al., 2014;
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Shean, 2013). Recall that Stewart and Chambless (2007) found that practitioners “prefer to rely
on clinical experience and supervision in their practice, not on research” (p. 208). From the
perspective of many practitioners, “treatment manual adherence is not the same as
psychotherapeutic expertise, and treatment fidelity is not the same as clinical competence”
(Havik & VandenBos, 1996, p. 265). In other words, what counts for evidence of treatment
quality from the practitioner’s point of view does not necessarily overlap with the standard of
evidence from the point of view of clinical researchers.
An Explanatory Framework
A Deeper Analysis?
The dissatisfaction of practitioners with research, as well as the gap that exists between
practitioners and researchers, are not new issues (see Drabick & Goldfried, 2000; Kazdin, 2008;
Lau et al., 2010). Researchers have analyzed these issues and tried to harmonize their efforts
with practitioners’ on both a practical level (e.g. Gyani et al., 2015; Kazdin, 2008) and on some
conceptual (e.g., epistemological) levels (e.g., Teachman et al., 2012; Shean, 2013). However, as
Cha and DiVasto (2017) put it, these groups remain “divided in how to seek solutions” (p. 504)
to therapeutic problems. Despite the efforts to close this rift between researchers and
practitioners, which began in earnest in 1949 with the accreditation of the Boulder model by the
American Psychological Association (Hunt, 1951), the rift remains open, and dissatisfaction
remains between both groups (Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Stewart & Chambless, 2007). As Lau and
colleagues (2010) wrote, “little progress has been made with respect to integrating research
findings into clinical practice” (p. 178).
Although much has been written about the scientist-practitioner gap from an empirical
and even a conceptual level, there does not appear in the literature an examination of the
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scientist-practitioner gap or of practitioner dissatisfaction with research that takes place on the
deepest conceptual level possible, what some call the “ontological” level (Lundh, 2017; Slife,
2004; Slife & Richardson, 2008; Slife & Wiggins, 2009), which pertains to what is seen as most
fundamental (Lundh, 2017). Given that some of the field’s best thinkers and researchers have yet
to resolve these tensions, even after conducting conceptually deep analyses of the problem, an
analysis on the deepest level would mark an important step in refining the field’s understanding
of practitioners’ dissatisfaction and pointing the way to potential solutions. Given that these
issues haven’t been resolved, is it perhaps worth conducting an ontological analysis to shed light
on new facets of researchers’ and practitioners’ differences, seeing what conceptual fruit might
follow?
But what, exactly, is meant by an analysis on the ontological level? Ontology refers
simply to a branch of philosophy that addresses questions about what is deepest or most
fundamental. It deals not with how we attain knowledge (i.e., epistemology) but with what
knowledge is about. In this case, analyzing practitioner dissatisfaction with research on an
ontological level will involve examining how the assumptions practitioners and researchers tend
to make about what is most fundamental differ and how these differences contribute to the
dissatisfaction themes developed above.
What Ontology?
What deeper assumptions are getting in the way of practitioner acceptance? What
assumptions are the researchers making, particularly, that might be less relevant or turn off the
clinician? Practitioners’ dissatisfaction has seemed to revolve, for example, around the heavy use
of abstractions on the part of the research community (e.g., the valuing of cleanness over
messiness, the abstractness of research findings). Yet, is it perhaps the case that something
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deeper underlies this propensity to abstract? Consider what Van Lange (2013) writes concerning
psychological theories: “A theory should pursue as high a level of abstraction as possible, to
transcend particular observations and link them at a deeper (i.e., more abstract) level to other
observations” (p. 43, emphases added). This tendency to regard abstractions as the deepest form
of truth—and to place them atop the hierarchy of knowledge—constitutes an ontology, or a
framework of assumptions about what is most real or fundamental, what has been called
abstractionism (Slife, Ghelfi, & Martin, 2017).
In order for the following section—where the connections between practitioner
dissatisfaction and abstractionism will be drawn—to be clearest, abstractionism and some of its
features must be introduced. Slife and colleagues (2017) have described seven features of
abstractionism, but only the four most salient features will be summarized here. These four
include (1) the separation of entities from their contexts, (2) the precedence of the simpler, (3)
prioritizing relations of similarity, and (4) top-down thinking. Separation in abstractionism
refers to the idea that entities are most deeply themselves when separated—or abstracted—from
the messiness of their contexts. From this perspective, for example, a person’s self is “only
secondarily related to the context [he or she] might be part of” (para. 5). The precedence of the
simpler refers to the ideal of parsimony in research, the idea that simpler or cleaner explanations
are better than complex or messy ones. Prioritizing relations of similarity consists of paying
attention to the way in which entities are alike while overlooking the ways that they are
different. Determining clinical trial group inclusion, for example, involves attending to the ways
in which participants are alike while taking measures to control for their individual differences.
Finally, top-down thinking refers to the process of reasoning from abstract rules to particular
cases. From
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an abstractionist perspective, since abstractions are most fundamentally true, it follows that “the
important aspects of our lives proceed from these abstractions” (Slife et al., 2017).
Abstractionism and Practitioner Dissatisfaction
In this section, the themes of practitioner dissatisfaction and the features of
abstractionism will be meshed. Where do the abstractionism features show up in practitioners’
dissatisfaction? In what way does the concept of abstractionism help to explain the rift between
practitioners and clinical researchers? The connection to abstractionism is clearest in theme of
cleanness over messiness, but it appears in the other themes as well. For example, practitioners
voiced that the abstractness of research findings diminished the perceived relevance of research
to their work (Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Shean, 2013). The lack of concrete engagement of
researchers is itself a sort of abstracting of a whole community (researchers from practitioners)
on the grounds that the scientific method can sufficiently illuminate truth even when
investigators are disengaged from the context of inquiry. Finally, the rule-following of
research—and practitioner resistance to EBPs and ESTs—harkens to the overarching theme of
abstractionism in that practitioners’ resistance is largely grounded in the abstractness of the
guidelines and rules emanating from research. In what follows, the role of abstractionism is
developed within each of the dissatisfaction themes.
Cleanness Over Messiness
Practitioners appear dissatisfied with the tendency of published research to reduce rich,
contextual phenomena to rules and regularities. It was seen that most clinical researchers believe
striving for internal validity is the way to conduct science and so do not see the need to adjust
their methods to the wants of practitioners, which would make sense if researchers are working
within an abstractionist framework. Indeed, to establish a treatment as empirically supported, the
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American Psychological Association (2006; 2002) requires that it have an internally valid effect
on outcomes, thus incentivizing the abstraction of particular cases so that universal claims can be
made even when these claims might have little bearing on the concrete, particular level of
psychotherapy. Perhaps the most frequent gripe practitioners express in the literature is with this
emphasis on the nomothetic over the idiographic (Lilienfeld et al., 2013). Yet, leaders in the
research community have continually prioritized the nomothetic, sometimes even basing the
value of research aimed at discovering idiographic truths (i.e., qualitative research) in its ability
to generate hypotheses that can then be tested in more “rigorous” ways (Kazdin, 2003).
Precedence of the simpler. Striving for rigor in the sense described above involves
cleaning up, or simplifying, the messiness of a given context. In psychotherapy research, is it not
part of the purpose of randomization and control in outcome studies to arrive at simpler
conclusions about whether interventions worked while minimizing the messiness of individual
differences? Isn’t the particularity of the participants and the complexity of their individual
responses to treatment is reduced? There is a discord between this tendency to abstract lawful—
or quasi-lawful—relations between the phenomena of psychotherapy and the messiness in which
practitioners work with individuals, a discord that has led practitioners to describe the most
“rigorous” outcome research as “misleading and simplistic” (Marzillier, 2004).
Separation. In the Practitioner Dissatisfaction section, it was shown that practitioners are
dissatisfied with the degree to which clinical researchers attempt to strip individuals from their
contexts in order to make generalizations across groups (Shean, 2013). Yet, as Slife and
colleagues (2017) highlight, this separation of individuals from their contexts is another feature
or consequence of adopting an abstractionist ontology: “Abstractionism, then, as an ontology,
postulates that what is most real or fundamental about the things or ideas in question is that
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which is abstracted from their contexts.” If one takes abstractions to be the most real and,
therefore, the primary aim of science, then contextual messiness—the collections of phenomena
that make individuals unique—will be seen as ultimately confounding. It makes sense, then, that
the methods given the most credence by clinical scientists as lending support to a particular
therapeutic approach (e.g., RCTs, quasi-experiments; Kazdin, 2003) minimize the effects of
individual uniqueness on study results. But it is this very uniqueness that practitioners are hoping
to learn how to work with when they consult the research literature, since this uniqueness is seen
as more fundamental in the domain of practice (Shean, 2013; Stewart & Chambless, 2007).
Abstractness of Research Findings
The difficulties many practitioners have found in trying to understand the relevance of
research also indicate the influence of abstractionism. Recall that many practitioners cited the
abstract aspects of research results as a reason for being skeptical of EBPs (Lilienfeld et al.,
2013). Recall also that this skepticism and resistance was rooted in the abstractness of research
language and measurement (Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Slife, Wright, & Yanchar, 2016), methods
that are designed to abstract and generalize results across unique participants. When practitioners
read research, it was shown, they tend to gravitate toward qualitative and case studies (Gyani et
al., 2014; Gyani et al., 2015), and they tend to seek treatment guidance in the form of collegial
support, supervision, and intuition more often than in peer-reviewed empirical research (Pignotti,
2009; Stewart & Chambless, 2007). Unlike most research, the forms of guidance that
practitioners tend to rely on pay close attention to individual clients’ unabstracted experiences
(Levitt, 2015). For example, when consulting directly with a colleague about a case, is not a
psychotherapist colleague likely to ask questions and respond to the particulars of the case?
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Relations of similarity. Are these practitioner issues not manifestations of the
abstractionist feature of selectively attending to relations of similarity? Specifically, practitioners
actually seem to be more interested in relations of difference (e.g., what, particularly, is going on
with a given client; Gyani et al., 2015) than in relations of similarity (e.g., depressed clients tend
to respond well to therapy x). Quantitative studies, particularly those that involve greater
experimental control, are especially well designed to identify such relations of similarity (Slife et
al., 2016), but they are not especially well suited to describing the unique experience of clients in
the process of psychotherapy (Shean, 2013). The higher status (American Psychological
Association, 2006; 2002) and relative preponderance of quantitative studies over qualitative
studies and case studies (Levitt, 2015) in the literature, then, might well contribute to the
persistent dissatisfaction of practitioners with research.
Lack of Concreteness
The divergence of researchers and practitioners can frustrate practitioners because
researchers tend to seem “removed from the concerns of the clinical trenches” (Meyer, 2007). It
is additionally frustrating in that the research itself is often inaccessible to practitioners, the
majority of whom must pay large sums of money to access articles in relevant journals or behind
paywalls online (Shaw, 2016). That is, the research is often separate from the context in which
practitioners work.
Separation. From the assumption that the truth at which research should aim is abstract,
it follows that research methods will aim to elucidate abstractions as clearly as possible. And the
procedure for accomplishing this—for doing “good” science—is considered by many clinical
researchers sufficient unto itself (Himeliem & Putnam, 2001). In other words, it is thought that
science can operate separate—or abstracted—from the institution of clinical practice. Its
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findings should, from the perspective of abstractionism, apply to the institution of practice
regardless of how involved researchers are in practice themselves (Himeliem & Putnam, 2001).
After all, if the truths at which science aims are truly universal and replicable, should not there
be no need for the institutions of research and practice to overlap as long as the methods are
adequately rigorous? As Meyer (2007) wrote concerning clinical researchers’ beliefs about
whether they should conduct psychotherapy themselves, “. . . a small but vocal minority of
researchers . . . find, for example, that ‘the last thing researchers should do is see one client per
week’ –primarily because such part-time exposure to clinical cases might interfere with one’s
impartiality as a scientist” (p. 259). To approximate truth in the objective and abstract, it seems
crucial to many researchers to extricate themselves from the land of the concrete, which is
associated with “subjective” biases. In fact, Meyer (2007) found in this survey that not a single
clinical researcher in their sample believed researchers should be required to practice
psychotherapy. Some even believed that researchers and practitioners should remain separate so
that researchers could avoid distorting their “impartiality” as scientists. Is it any wonder that
practitioners have felt that much of the research offered them is out of touch with their reality?
Rule-following of Research
Relations of similarity. Practitioners have challenged the veracity and utility of the
process of organizing clients into “diagnostic categories” in order to better fit psychotherapy into
the procedures of research (Levine et al., 1992; Yalom, 2009). Organizing and studying clients
according to diagnostic categories points to another central feature of abstractionism, its
emphasis on relations of similarity over relations of difference. This feature of abstractionism
would dictate focusing on the relations of similarity between, say, depressed research
participants, and purposely not attending to their relations of difference. The goal of
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psychotherapy research from an abstractionist perspective is to arrive at statements such as
“therapy x efficaciously and effectively ameliorates symptoms of diagnosis y in population(s) z”
(e.g., Wampold & Imel, 2015). Abstractive categorization, of course, is central to the process of
forming and testing such hypotheses in this fashion.
As was mentioned, this type of research has not gone without its resistance from
practitioners. Yalom (2009) captures this sentiment when he advises “the next generation of
therapists” against diagnosing their clients except when a diagnosis is required by insurance
companies: “Today's psychotherapy students are exposed to too much emphasis on diagnosis.
Managed care administrators demand that therapists arrive quickly at a precise diagnosis and
then proceed upon a course of brief, focused therapy that matches that particular diagnosis.
Sounds good. Sounds logical and efficient. But it has precious little to do with reality” (p. 4,
emphasis added). The tension between reifying the abstractions of client categories and
maintaining their contextual uniqueness cuts through Yalom’s words. Yalom continues to
describe the process of treatment via strict diagnoses and treatment protocols an “attempt to
legislate scientific precision into being when it is neither possible nor desirable” (p. 4). Yalom is
objecting to the reifying of abstractions when, for him and most other practitioners, reality is
actually more pristine in its thick, situated, and unabstracted state (Shean, 2013).
Top-down thinking. The presence of top-down thinking, another feature of
abstractionism, can help explain the dissatisfaction practitioners have expressed about the push
to make precise diagnoses and to administer precise treatment plans. Top-down thinking refers to
the notion that abstracted universals or rules can and should be strictly applied to particular
instances, in both research and practice, as opposed to more reflexive approaches where
researchers and clinicians remain open to respond and interpret situations (Binder, Holgersen, &
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Moltu, 2012). For example, if a sufficient number of well controlled psychotherapy outcome
studies concluded that diaphragmatic breathing reduced psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia
patients, then one could justifiably begin with diaphragmatic breathing in the treatment of
schizophrenia (Christopherson, 2016). Many Practitioners would not deny that abstract
statements about what works for whom can be helpful guideposts (Marzillier, 2004), but
practitioners ultimately need to respond to their clients’ experience, no matter how messy or
surprising it is (Slife, Johnson, & Jennings, 2015). In other words, practitioners’ work has often
to operate from clients’ immediate, lived experience—in conjunction with the practitioner’s lived
interpretation of that experience—primarily guides the direction of treatment. And this process,
from practitioners’ perspective, is not abstractable into a stepwise process without
misrepresenting or misunderstanding its nature (Shean, 2013; Slife, 2004).
A Potential Alternative: Ontological Relationality
How does this new understanding of the problems aid us in coming to some kind of
rapprochement between researchers and practitioners? The analysis has three implications. First,
it provides the conceptual roots of the problem—including the recognizing of different sorts of
phenomena as most fundamental, a difference that researchers would do well to more richly
comprehend. The phenomenal world of the practitioner, as has been shown, is intensely contextladen. In administering psychotherapy, practitioners must attend to—and ultimately help
change—the lived experience of unique individuals and groups. These experiences are concrete,
embedded in particular contexts, and invite practitioners to experience this richer form of reality
as deeper than the abstract.
It is important to ask who is being served by psychotherapy research. Of course, this
research is aimed at improving psychotherapy clients’ lives through the services of
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psychotherapists. If this is true, it is necessary to take the practitioners’ world more into account.
Unlike pure mathematics, for example, psychotherapy research cannot thrive in isolation. It
must, in some sense, cater to the experienced reality of its consumers, psychotherapists.
Otherwise, the beneficiaries of psychotherapy research, psychotherapy clients, will not benefit by
all the efforts and all the funding that pour into the research institution. No manufacturer of any
good would succeed, no matter how high-quality the product, without a way to deliver its
product to the public. Yet, the ontological level of disconnect between researchers and
practitioners has effectively prevented the transmission of thought and study resources from
making as strong an impact on psychotherapy practice as they should.
Second, the ontological level of disconnect is the reason there’s been no sufficient
resolution to the scientist-practitioner gap. Not only have they been interpreting differing
phenomena as most fundamental; both researchers and practitioners have been dealing with an
abstractionist understanding of science. The work so far done to ameliorate the problems that
come with the scientist-practitioner gap has been conducted with an inadequate understanding of
the origins of the gap—that is, without understanding its ontological underpinnings. This
analysis, then, offers a new of understanding that suggests potentially novel solutions, one of
which will be outlined below.
Third, outlining the ontological culprit also implies other ontological conceptions that can
be explored. One such conception has been called ontological relationality. These scholars, some
of them psychological practitioners, have outlined this ontology because they encountered
similar problems abstracting from lived experience in their practice and research (Binder et al.,
2011; Slife & Richardson, 2008; Slife & Wiggins, 2009). In contrast to abstractionism,
ontological relationality posits that relationships are the most fundamentally real entities. From
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this perspective, one could say the betweenness of phenomena is more fundamental their
separation (Slife, 2004). Their relations of difference—and, therefore, the individuality of each
client or study participant—from this point of view, remain as or more important to understand
than the abstracted relations of similarity. Additionally, this ontological conception can address
practitioners’ gripes with top-down thinking and the tendency to separate individuals from their
contexts inherent in abstractionism.
Ontological relationality accommodates practitioners’ desires for more context-sensitive
interventions by recognizing relations, not abstractions, as most fundamental. That is, the
uniqueness of each client is automatically assumed and accounted for, not ignored. By
emphasizing relations as most fundamental, ontological relationality overcomes the practitioner
gripes associated with the separation of clients from their contexts. Relationality assumes
individuals are most deeply understood in a situated context (Slife & Richardson, 2008), that is,
as members of larger relationships (e.g., of families, religions, etc.), setting the groundwork for
research that honors the experience of practitioners (and their clients) as importantly embedded
in the process of therapy.
Research that could be considered ontologically relational often falls within the
qualitative tradition (Levitt, Pomerville, & Surace, 2016). Qualitative psychotherapy research
aims primarily to understand the lived experience of clients in the therapeutic process.
Researchers in this tradition are interested in clients’ experience of change throughout therapy, in
what the process is actually like, both when it helps and does not (Levitt, 2015; Mörtl & Gelo,
2015). As Binder and colleagues suggest, “Qualitative methods are increasingly being
recognised as useful for investigating the experiential world of clients and therapists. Their
exploration of the relational context of clinical interventions and their study of personal growth
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processes has led to this recognition” (2011). Instead of reducing and abstracting experience,
these methods aim to understand it in its most situated, singular form. They aim, in other words,
to describe psychotherapy in a context and language that recognizes the concrete and
particular—the lived experiences of clients—as most fundamental.
Even relational qualitative research, however, deals in abstractions, namely, in language.
It is important to consider, however, how its aims differ from abstractionist research. Although
relational qualitative research uses language, a system of abstractions, as a tool, it is ultimately
aimed at understanding the lived experience of participants, the very information practitioners
tend to prefer when seeking research (Gyani et al., 2015). Lived experience, in other words,
occupies the highest seat of reality for the qualitative researcher. From this perspective, while
abstractions (e.g., lists of “best practices”) would certainly remain significant, they would not be
seen as the most real or the most important products of psychotherapy research.
It also remains to consider how reconceptualizing research along ontologically relational,
less rule- or procedure-based (Levitt et al., 2016) lines would change the notion of what
constitutes an “evidence-based practice.” What would the skills and learning practitioners gain
from consuming research look like? Throughout the literature on practitioner dissatisfaction,
practitioners appear to strive for contextual excellence. They seek research, in other words, that
will help them develop an appropriate responsiveness to clients’ concrete needs in the moment as
their understanding of clients unfolds. Although the development and application of such
contextual skills might not admit of the same level of precision that abstractionist research aims
to achieve, researchers and practitioners believe they are possible to teach and develop (Slife,
2017; Slife, 2004).
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Finally, it should be stressed that ontological relationality is one alternative ontology to
abstractionism among many. It is included here as much to suggest that alternatives exist as to
suggest it is the alternative. Certainly, this branch of theoretical psychology could benefit from
additional commentaries on the ontological underpinnings of research and practice. At the very
least, it is hoped that this paper has helped develop a deeper understanding in the reader of the
tension between psychological practitioners and clinical researchers.
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